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The importance of remanufacturing used products into new ones has been widely recognized in the literatureand in practice. In this paper, we address the problem of choosing the appropriate reverse channel structure
for the collection of used products from customers. Speciﬁcally, we consider a manufacturer who has three
options for collecting such products: (1) she can collect them herself directly from the customers, (2) she can
provide suitable incentives to an existing retailer (who already has a distribution channel) to induce the collec-
tion, or (3) she can subcontract the collection activity to a third party. Based on our observations in the industry,
we model the three options described above as decentralized decision-making systems with the manufacturer
being the Stackelberg leader. When considering decentralized channels, we ﬁnd that ceteris paribus, the agent,
who is closer to the customer (i.e., the retailer), is the most effective undertaker of product collection activity
for the manufacturer. In addition, we show that simple coordination mechanisms can be designed such that
the collection effort of the retailer and the supply chain proﬁts are attained at the same level as in a centrally
coordinated system.
Key words : supply chain management; reverse logistics; remanufacturing; channel structure
History : Accepted by Christopher Tang, former department editor; received October 24, 2003. This paper was
with the authors 26 months for 3 revisions.
1. Introduction
The importance of the environmental performance of
products and processes for sustainable manufactur-
ing and service operations increasingly is being recog-
nized. While legislation introduced in Europe, North
America, and Japan encourages this awareness, many
corporations have proactively taken measures in
anticipation of evolving environmental performance
requirements. Increasingly, manufacturers of durable
and nondurable goods are establishing economi-
cally viable production and distribution systems that
enable remanufacturing of used products in parallel
with the manufacturing of new units. Remanufac-
tured products are typically upgraded to the quality
standards of new products, so that they can be sold
in new product markets. In this paper, we consider
product categories in which there is no distinction
between a remanufactured and a manufactured prod-
uct, and we refer to the distribution systems, which
use a combination of manufacturing and remanufac-
turing, as closed-loop supply chains.
The prospect of remanufacturing poses interesting
questions with respect to the design and management
of closed-loop supply chains. The goal of this paper
is to develop a detailed understanding of the implica-
tions that a manufacturer’s reverse channel choice has
on forward channel decisions and the used-product
return rate from the customers.
In current practice, we ﬁnd a variety of reverse
channel formats deployed by manufacturers. In some
cases, manufacturers collect their used products
directly from the customers. For instance, Xerox
Corporation provides prepaid mailboxes so that
customers can easily return their used copy or print
cartridges to Xerox without incurring any costs.
The company also remanufactures high-value, end-
of-lease copiers (Xerox Corporation 2001). The used
copiers are collected directly by Xerox as new ones are
installed. Overall, the green remanufacturing program
saves the company 40%–65% in manufacturing costs
through the reuse of parts and materials (Ginsburg
2001). Similar activities are undertaken by Hewlett
Packard Corporation for computers and peripherals,
and by Canon for print and copy cartridges.
Manufacturers of consumer products such as
single-use cameras and mobile phones utilize retail-
ers for collecting their used products. For instance,
Eastman Kodak Company receives single-use cameras
from large retailers that also develop ﬁlm for cus-
tomers. On average, 76% of the weight of a disposed
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camera is reused in the production of a new one. Each
time a camera is returned to Kodak, the retailer is
reimbursed a ﬁxed fee per camera and the transporta-
tion costs.
In the auto industry, independent third parties (i.e.,
dismantlers) are handling used-product collection
activities for the original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs). Recently, the “big three” auto manufacturers
in the United States started to invest in joint research
and remanufacturing partnerships with dismantling
centers to beneﬁt from their scale economies and
experience (Bylinsky 1995). Third parties such as
GENCO Distribution System are also preferred by
some consumer goods manufacturers for their expe-
rience in used-product collection (Hickey 2001).
To investigate how reverse channel choice affects
the forward channel decisions and the used-product
return rates, we consider a two-echelon supply chain
and model a single manufacturer-retailer dyad with
product remanufacturing.1 Based on observations
from current practice and the extant literature, we
consider three reverse channel formats: (1) manufac-
turer collecting used products directly from the cus-
tomers (Model M), (2) manufacturer contracting the
collection of used products to the retailer (Model R),
and (3) manufacturer contracting the collection of
used products to a third party (Model 3P). We con-
trast the results for the decentralized channels with
the centrally coordinated system (Model C) to illus-
trate potential sources of inefﬁciencies in closed-loop
supply chains.
More speciﬁcally, we address the following research
questions:
(1) How are the wholesale price, the retail price,
and the total channel proﬁts affected by the choice of
the reverse channel structure?
(2) How do the closed-loop supply chain structures
inﬂuence the incentives to invest in used-product col-
lection and the product return rates?
Some of the key results of this paper demonstrate
that in a closed-loop supply chain, the retailer has
an important dual role due to his proximity to the
market. The analysis shows that when prices are sen-
sitive to changes in unit production costs, by being
closer to the ﬁnal demand, the retailer can efﬁciently
reﬂect unit cost savings from remanufacturing to the
ﬁnal price of the product, and jointly optimize the
investment in used-product collection. The manufac-
turer is at a disadvantage in coordinating pricing and
used-product return rates, because she faces double
marginalization in the forward channel. The third-
party model is the least-preferred option because the
1 Throughout this paper, we adopt the convention of using the pro-
noun “she” to refer to the manufacturer. All other supply chain
members are refered to by the pronoun “he.”
payments made to the third party for undertaking
collection become a direct cost to the supply chain,
do not induce incentives to increase the ﬁnal demand
and, therefore, reduce the proﬁtability of product
remanufacturing. The model also demonstrates that
the manufacturer can further improve the proﬁts of
the R Model to the level of a centrally coordinated
system by using a single two-part tariff. Because we
deﬁne the two-part tariff contingent on the product
return rate, it not only coordinates the pricing deci-
sion of the retailer in the forward channel but also the
collection effort in the reverse channel.
On a broader level, this paper contributes to our
understanding about the interactions between reverse
and forward channel decisions, as well as the incen-
tives of the agents to invest in used-product collection
in different reverse channel structures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
the following section, we brieﬂy discuss the current
literature and the contribution of this paper. Sec-
tion 3 is devoted to the conceptualization and formu-
lation of the model. Following the development of the
model, the analytical results for the optimal closed-
loop supply chain structures are presented in §4. Sec-
tion 5 examines channel coordination mechanisms
with used product collection. We outline the limita-
tions of this work and possible directions for future
research in §6.
2. Literature
This paper draws on and contributes to several
streams of literature, each of which we review
below. A growing literature in operations manage-
ment addresses reverse logistics management issues
for remanufacturable products. We refer the reader
to Fleischmann et al. (1997) and Guide et al. (2000)
for complete literature reviews. The basic underlying
assumption in these papers is that the planning of
closed-loop supply chain operations, such as network
design (Krikke 1998), shop-ﬂoor control (Guide et al.
1997), and inventory control (van der Laan 1997) is
done by a central decision maker to optimize total
system performance. By adapting a game-theoretic
approach, we relax the centralized planner assump-
tion and model the independent decision-making pro-
cess of each supply chain member. Speciﬁcally, we
examine the interaction between pricing decisions in
the forward channel and the incentives to collect used
products under different reverse channel structures.
There is a growing number of research papers
on reverse logistics that use game theory to model
remanufacturing decisions. Majumder and Groenevelt
(2001) examine how third-party remanufacturing can
induce competitive behavior when the recycled prod-
ucts cannibalize the demand for the original prod-
uct. Debo et al. (2002) model the durability choice
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of the (re)manufacturer when consumers act strategi-
cally. While we speciﬁcally model the reverse channel
design decisions, in the cited papers, such decisions
are assumed exogenous to the model structure.
In the supply chain management literature,
Pasternack (1985), Emmons and Gilbert (1998), and
Donohue (2000) determine optimal product return
contracts for short life-cycle products. The returns
considered in these studies occur at the end of the
selling season due to demand uncertainty and the
retailer’s overstocking of inventory. Related to this
group of work, Padmanabhan and Png (1997) explore
how ordering ﬂexibility from buy-back contracts
affects the retail-level competition. In contrast, we
consider used products, which are returned from con-
sumers for remanufacturing, and we discuss contract
forms, which would jointly coordinate the reverse and
the forward channels.
Recent research also shows a strong link between
supply chain management and environmental im-
provement. Bierma and Waterstraat (2000) and
Reiskin et al. (2000) discuss contractual mechanisms
to reduce resource use. Corbett and DeCroix (2001)
examine shared-savings contracts to overcome incen-
tive conﬂicts between a supplier and a buyer to
reduce the use of indirect materials. This recent
stream of work focuses on cost savings derived
from reduction of consumption (ex ante), while we
consider cost savings derived from product reuse
(ex post). In the marketing literature, Stern et al.
(1996) describe the role and the function of each
channel member in different closed-loop supply chain
structures without providing a quantitative basis for
comparing these different channel formats. In con-
trast, in this paper, we try to provide such a compari-
son between the roles of the different channel parties.
The quantitative models of channel design in mar-
keting have only looked at forward distribution sys-
tems (Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin
1983, Coughlan 1985). While the model structure pre-
sented in this paper is consistent with this stream
of work, we expand these models to also include
reverse product and ﬁnancial ﬂows from consumers
to manufacturers.
Last, but not least, there is also growing research
interest in decision models for used-product acquisi-
tion when there is quality uncertainty in the return
ﬂows. See Guide and Van Wassenhove (2001) for a
detailed discussion of this issue. In this paper, we
focus on the channel choice decision and assume
homogenous quality of returned products.
Next, we present our modeling assumptions and
the three closed-loop supply chain models.
3. Model Assumptions and Notation
We use the following notation throughout the paper:
cm will denote the unit cost of manufacturing a new
product, and cr the unit cost of remanufacturing a
returned product into a new one, p is the retail price
of the product, w is the unit wholesale price, and b
will denote the unit transfer price of a returned prod-
uct from the retailer/third party to the manufacturer.
Dp	 is the demand for the new product in the mar-
ket as a function of product price, and 
ij denotes
the proﬁt function for channel member j in supply
chain model i Superscript i will take values C M R,
and 3P , which will denote the centrally coordinated,
manufacturer collecting, retailer collecting, and the
third-party collecting models, respectively. The sub-
script j will take values M , R, and 3P , which will
denote the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third
party, respectively.
The primary goal of this paper is to understand
the implications of different closed-loop supply chain
structures on incentives to invest in used-product col-
lection and on supply chain proﬁts. Hence, we con-
sider the following scenario and make the following
modeling assumptions.
Suppose that the manufacturer has incorporated a
remanufacturing process for used products into her
original production system, so that she can manufac-
ture a new product directly from raw materials, or
remanufacture part or whole of a returned unit into a
new product.
Assumption 1. Producing a new product by using a
used product is less costly than manufacturing a new one,
i.e., cr < cm and cr is the same for all remanufactured
products.
This assumption states that savings from materials
and assembly of subsystems within the new product
dominate the additional costs of disassembly, inspec-
tion for reusability, and the cost of remanufacturing.2
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the manufacturer strictly
prefers a higher product return rate to a lower prod-
uct return rate from the market because, through
remanufacturing, she can lower her production costs.
The last part of Assumption 1 can easily be relaxed by
incorporating a yield rate on returned product quality.
The yield rate models the uncertainty in the reusabil-
ity of used products due to different usage patterns.3
Assumption 2. We characterize the reverse channel
performance by  , the return rate of used products from
the customers.  denotes the fraction of current genera-
tion products remanufactured from returned units, i.e., 0≤
2 Kodak incorporates considerations such as part reusability, ease of
disassembly, and recoverability into the product design process for
its single-use camera line. This enables them to easily disassemble
returned cameras and, thus, manufacture new ones at lower unit
costs by only replacing parts such as the lens and the battery.
3 It can easily be shown that the uncertainty in the returned product
quality reduces the incentives to invest in used product collection,
because the beneﬁt from the investment will be lower.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.4
3.7
7]
 on
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
17
, a
t 0
5:1
5 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Savaskan, Bhattacharya, and Van Wassenhove: Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models
242 Management Science 50(2), pp. 239–252, © 2004 INFORMS
 ≤ 1. We model  as a function of the product collection
effort, which is denoted by I , the investment in collection
activities. Such investments can be considered as promo-
tional expenditures undertaken by the collecting agent.
Hence, one can think of  as the response of con-
sumers who have an incentive/enthusiasm for the
remanufacturing of their used products as a result
of the promotional/advertising activities of the agent
in the reverse channel. To characterize the diminish-
ing returns to investment, we use the cost structure
 = √I/CL, where CL is a scaling parameter. Sim-
ilar forms of response functions have been widely
used in the advertising response models of con-
sumer retention and product awareness (Lilien et al.
1992, Fruchter and Kalish 1997, Zhao 2000), and in
salesforce effort response models in the marketing
literature (Coughlan 1993). In the operations liter-
ature, Porteus (1986) and Fine and Porteus (1989)
use similar investment functions to investigate oppor-
tunities for process improvement and lot sizing by
investing in setup cost reduction and quality improve-
ment. This paper investigates tradeoffs that are simi-
lar to those in the above studies in a remanufacturing
context.
From Assumptions 1 and 2, the average unit cost
of manufacturing can be written as c= cm1− 	+ cr .
Note that when every consumer returns his or her
used product (i.e.,  = 1), c = cr . If the return rate
of used products is zero, then all demand will be
satisﬁed from manufactured units and, therefore,
c= cm. If we denote unit cost savings from reuse
by  (i.e.,  = cm − cr ), the average unit cost is
given by cm− . Similar cost structures can also
be found in the literature, which looks at process
improvement decisions and cost reduction incentives
in supply chains (Gupta and Loulou 1998, Gilbert and
Cvsa 2000). The similarity in formulation is consistent
because, in this paper, an increase in product remanu-
facturing would also mean a reduction in the average
unit cost of manufacturing.
Assumption 3. There is a variable unit cost of collect-
ing and handling a returned unit, which is denoted by A.
For remanufacturing to be economically viable, we assume
that A<, i.e., the ﬁxed payment per unit is less than the
savings generated per unit from remanufacturing.
One can think of A as the ﬁxed payment given
to the consumer who returns a used product. Con-
sider the reverse vending machines that collect used
products (e.g., soft drink cans). Each customer who
returns a used product to these machines receives a
ﬁxed payment per unit, which is represented by the
parameter A in our model. Note that A is exoge-
nous to the model and does not affect the demand
for the product. This would be the case for consumer
products (i.e., cameras, cartridges) with low salvage
value and no secondary markets (Swan 1972). In the
case of durable goods, one should also consider how
the secondary market/trade-in value of a used prod-
uct affects the consumer’s decision to replace his or
her used product. Assumption 3 also implies that A
does not increase with the scale of operations. This
is consistent with supply chain structures, where the
reverse channel has sufﬁcient capacity so that the
product return rate is driven by the collection effort
and by induced awareness and participation of con-
sumers in product remanufacturing.4
The total cost of collection C	 can then be char-
acterized as a function of the return rate of used
products and is given by C	= I +ADp	= CL2+
ADp	, where Dp	 is the total number of units
returned from consumers and remanufactured into
new products. Because we intend to compare the
incentives of collecting agents across different reverse
channel structures, we assume the same cost structure
for all closed-loop supply chain models. In the conclu-
sion section, we discuss other factors that may bring
in collection cost advantages to some reverse channel
structures.
Assumption 4. We consider a two-echelon supply
chain and model a bilateral monopoly between a single
manufacturer and a single retailer. This enables us to
explore the implications of assigning a dual role to a for-
ward channel member. Speciﬁcally, if the retailer under-
takes the collection effort, he not only determines the
quantity demanded in the market by setting the retail price
of the product, but also by his collection effort level, he
inﬂuences the average manufacturing cost of the product.
Even though we consider a single manufacturer-retailer
structure, the manufacturer can, in fact, sell to different
retailers if the retailers are not in direct competition. The
manufacturer can also manufacture competing brands, but
she does not sell competing brands to the same retailer and
the brands do not share the same manufacturing process.5
The retailer can also carry many brands, but for simplicity,
we consider only one brand for which he takes decisions
independent of the other existing brands.
Assumption 5. Dp	 =  − p, with  and  being
positive parameters and >cm.
We assume a downward sloping linear demand
function. Lee and Staelin (1997) show that the ver-
tical interaction between the channel members and
the optimality of the channel strategies depend on
4 For instance, Kodak and Kmart engage in joint promotional activ-
ities to increase the awareness of the single-use camera recycling
program among young consumers (Discount Store News 1994).
5 This enables us to decouple the cross-brand elasticities in recom-
mending a suitable closed-loop supply chain to the manufacturer
in different environments.
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the convexity of the demand functions. Therefore, it
should be pointed out that while the linear demand
assumption is consistent with the literature (Bulow
1982, Weng 1995) and enables us to develop a ﬁrst-
cut analysis of the closed-loop supply chain decision
of the manufacturer, the generalizability of the results
to nonlinear demand functions is a question of future
research.6 The last part of Assumption 5 is a condition
for nonnegative demand.
To model the supply chain members’ incentives
under different closed-loop supply chain structures,
we use the principal-agent framework (Laffont and
Tirole 1993) and make the following assumption con-
cerning the power structure in the supply chain.
Assumption 6. In all our supply chain models with
remanufacturing, the manufacturer has sufﬁcient channel
power over the retailer and the third party to act as a
Stackelberg leader.
This assumption states that in determining the out-
come of the game played between the manufacturer
and the retailer, the manufacturer uses her foresight
about the retailer’s and the third party’s reaction func-
tions in her decision making. The Stackelberg struc-
ture for the solution of similar games has been widely
used in the supply chain literature (Tayur et al. 1998).
Assumption 7. While optimizing their objective func-
tions, all supply chain members have access to the same
information.
This assumption enables us to control for inefﬁ-
ciencies and risk-sharing issues resulting from infor-
mation asymmetry (Corbett and De Groote 2000).
Savaskan et al. (1999) examine the closed-loop supply
chain performance when the manufacturer faces an
adverse selection problem.
Assumption 8. The closed-loop supply chain decisions
are considered in a single-period setting.
We assume the previous existence of the product in
the market. Those products sold in the previous peri-
ods can be returned to the manufacturer for reuse.
Hence, the focus of analysis is on the average sup-
ply chain proﬁts per period when similar products are
introduced to the market repeatedly.7
4. Supply Chain Models
with Remanufacturing
This section presents three decentralized supply chain
models with remanufacturing, viz., the closed-loop
6 We conjecture that the results of the model would hold for all
demand patterns with nonpositive elasticities with respect to price.
7 Kodak introduces new models of disposable cameras, which can
incorporate components from previous generations.
Figure 1 Supply Chain Models with Remanufacturing
Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer
Retailer RetailerRetailer
Third Party
(b) Model M (c) Model R (d) Model 3P
Manufacturer
Retailer
(a) Model C
Forward Flow
Reverse Flow
supply chain with the manufacturer collecting used
products (Model M, Figure 1b), the closed-loop
supply chain with the retailer collecting used prod-
ucts (Model R, Figure 1c), and the closed-loop
supply chain with third party collecting used prod-
ucts (Model 3P, Figure 1d). As a benchmark case,
the Centrally Coordinated System (Model C, Figure 1a)
is analyzed to highlight inefﬁciencies resulting from
decentralization of decision making, and is later used
for deriving the channel coordinating pricing scheme.
We compare the models with respect to the whole-
sale price, the retail price, the product return rate, and
the total supply chain proﬁts. The proﬁt functions of
the supply chain members are shown to be concave
in the decision variables, so the ﬁrst-order conditions
are used throughout to characterize the optimality
of the decision variables.8 The single manufacturer-
single retailer bilateral monopoly model without prod-
uct remanufacturing is well known in the literature
(Jeuland and Shugan 1983) and has been extensively
analyzed. For comparison, we will refer to the results
of this model in some parts of this paper.9
4.1. Model C—Centrally Coordinated System
The centrally coordinated system (Model C) provides
a benchmark scenario to compare the decentralized
models with respect to the supply chain proﬁts and
the reverse channel performance. Because there is
a single decision maker, the wholesale price w and
the transfer price b are irrelevant to the formulation
of the objective function. Hence, the central planner
optimizes
Max
p 

C = −p	p− cm+ −CL2−A−p	
(1)
8 For the clarity of the text, all proofs are provided in the appendix.
9 The results of the bilateral monopoly model without remanufac-
turing are given in Appendix A.
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The simultaneous solution of the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions results in
p∗C = +cm
2
− 1
2
−A	2 −cm
4CL−−A	2
and
∗C = −cm	−A	
4CL−−A	2

To ensure comparison of the interior point solu-
tions to all four models, we impose the condition of

C	/ =1< 0 on  (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A).
From this condition follows Assumption 9.
Assumption 9. The parameter CL deﬁned in the col-
lection cost function is assumed to be sufﬁciently large,
such that ∗C < 1. More speciﬁcally, 4CL > − cm	+
−A	−A	.
Assumption 9 ensures that remanufacturing is suf-
ﬁciently costly so that it is not economically viable
to manufacture all units from used products (similar
assumptions have been made in Gupta and Loulou
1998 and Gilbert and Cvsa 2000). Note that the right-
hand side is the maximum savings contribution of
remanufacturing if all the products were remanufac-
tured, i.e., ∗C = 1.
From the best-response functions, it follows that the
retail price charged is lower than the retail price in the
centrally coordinated system without remanufacturing
(see Table 1 in Appendix A). Part of the system proﬁt
gains from reduced unit variable costs are passed on
to the customers as a lower retail price, which also
enhances the demand of the product. The demand
and total proﬁts in the coordinated distribution and
collection system can be found by evaluating Dp	
and 
Cp 	 at p∗C and ∗C . The results are shown in
Table 1 in Appendix A.
4.2. Model M—Manufacturer Collecting
In this model, the manufacturer undertakes the used
product collection effort, and decides on the whole-
sale price w and the product return rate,  . An exam-
ple of this form of closed-loop supply chain structure
is Xerox’s network for printer and copy cartridges in
Europe and in the United States. Speciﬁcally, Xerox
provides prepaid mailboxes so that the used car-
tridges can be returned to Xerox at no expense to the
customers.
Because the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader,
we begin by characterizing the best-response function
of the retailer. For a given w, the retailer’s problem is
Maxp
MR = p−w	−p	.
Because the objective function is concave in p,
the retailer’s ﬁrst-order condition characterizes the
unique best response, p∗M = +w	/2	. The
derived demand function of the retailer is given by
Dw	= −w	/2.
The manufacturer’s problem can be stated as
Max
w

MM =
−w
2
w− cm+ −CL2
−A −w
2
 (2)
Again, the objective function is jointly concave in w
and  , and the manufacturer’s ﬁrst-order conditions
characterize the unique best response,
w∗M = +cm
2
− −A	
2−cm	
28CL−−A	2
and
∗M = −cm	−A	
8CL−−A	2

Optimal retail price and equilibrium channel proﬁts
can easily be found by substitution of w∗M , ∗M . The
results are listed in Table 2 in Appendix A.
4.3. Model R—Retailer Collecting
In this model, the retailer also engages in the pro-
motion and collection of used products in addition
to distributing new products. One characteristic of
this channel format is that the ownership of used
products initially rests with the retailer after the col-
lection. To take the products back, the manufacturer
pays a transfer price b per product returned to her
from the retailer. The transfer price, b is determined
by the manufacturer. As an example of this closed-
loop supply chain structure, Kodak currently engages
retailers that sell their products to participate in the
collection activity of the disposed cameras. Similarly,
for electronics products, such as television sets, home
appliances, personal computers, retailers also act as
collection points when used products are returned
to them at the moment of new sales. In this model,
the retailer decides the retail price p, and the product
return rate  , through his collection effort.
The retailer’s problem is given by Maxp 
RR =
 − p	p − w + b − p	 − CL2 − A − p	.
Because the objective function is jointly concave in
p and  , from the ﬁrst-order conditions, the best
responses are p∗R = +w− b−A	∗	/2	 and
∗R = b−A	/2CL		−p∗R	.
Given p∗R and ∗R, the manufacturer optimizes
Max
w

RM = −p∗R	w− cm+∗R− b∗R−p∗R	
(3)
From the concavity of the objective function in w,
it follows that for a given b,
w∗R = +cm
2
− − b	b−A	−cm	
24CL−−A	b−A	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The optimal value of the wholesale price can then be
used to compute the demand and the proﬁts for the
manufacturer. The manufacturer’s proﬁts are given by
−cm	2/8	
1−−A	b−A	/4CL	

Note that because the manufacturer’s problem is
concave in w for a given b, this enables us to ﬁnd
the value of b, which maximizes the optimal value of
the manufacturer’s proﬁt function.10 Thus, we make
the following observation.11
Observation 1. Because the manufacturer’s proﬁts
are increasing with respect to b, the transfer price b is
set equal to its upper bound of , i.e., b=.
Surprisingly, in the R Model, we ﬁnd that the man-
ufacturer does not extract any of the direct savings
from remanufacturing, but prefers to pass them on to
the retailer. There are two main driving forces to this
seemingly counterintuitive result.
When the retailer undertakes the used-product col-
lection activity, a unit increase in demand increases
his proﬁts in two distinct ways. First, an additional
unit of demand contributes the margin (i.e., p − w)
from the purchase of the new product. Second, it par-
tially contributes the salvage value (i.e., b − A) of a
used product. In other words, in the R Model, the
retailer has a higher marginal proﬁtability from a unit
increase in demand than the cases when the manu-
facturer or the third party are the collecting agents.
Hence, for a given level of  , passing on all the sav-
ings to the retailer results in increased payoffs for the
retailer (i.e., −A	 > b−A	), and this acts as an
incentive to reduce the retail price of the product and
increase demand, which results in increased proﬁts. A
second-degree effect of increasing demand also acts to
set  . A larger market size makes used-product collec-
tion more proﬁtable for the retailer (i.e., scale effect)
and, hence, the retailer has an incentive to increase his
investment in used-product collection, and increase  .
The manufacturer prefers to transfer cost savings
directly to the retailer for the following reasons. Even
though she does not internalize the unit cost savings
from remanufacturing directly, her proﬁts increase
because of an increase in the product demand. Note
that if the manufacturer had retained part of the unit
cost savings (i.e.,  − b	 > 0	, because of double
marginalization in the channel, a part of these savings
would be internalized in the retailer’s proﬁt margin
10 See Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Whitin (1955), and Zabel (1970) for
a similar use of the methodology.
11 Note that to ensure concavity of the retailer’s objective function,
b ≤  should be satisﬁed. See Lemma 1 in Appendix A. Alterna-
tively, one can also show that in equilibrium, when b >, retailer’s
proﬁts become negative.
later when the retailer set the product price. As a con-
sequence, the demand and the investment in used-
product collection would be lower.
The analysis of the R Model shows that the way
the cost savings from remanufacturing are shared
between supply chain members has important impli-
cations for pricing decisions in the forward supply
chain, both for the manufacturer and the retailer.
4.4. Model 3P—Third-Party Collecting
It is also not unusual to see the used-product collec-
tion activity contracted by the manufacturer to a third
party, who is engaged only in the collection of the
used products from the market. The Internet has been
an essential enabler for such third-party managed
product return channels (Hickey 2001). In these
closed-loop supply chains, the third party acts as a
broker between the customer and the manufacturer.
In the 3P Model, for a given transfer price b of a
used product, the third party maximizes his proﬁts to
determine the investment in used-product collection
and, hence, decides the value of  . As in Model M,
the retailer engages only in the distribution of the
product. The retailer solves for p∗3P as a function of
the wholesale price set by the manufacturer. The third
party assumes the collection activity and maximizes
Max 
3P3P = b−p∗3P 	−CL2−A−p∗3P 	. From
the concavity of the objective function in  , the opti-
mal value of the product return rate ∗3P is given by
b−A	/2CL		−p∗3P 	.
Given p∗3P and ∗3P , the manufacturer solves
Max
w

3PM = −p∗3P 	w− cm+ − b	∗3P  (4)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, the manufacturer
sets the wholesale price of the product to
w∗3P = +cm
2
−−cm
2
[
b−A	−b	/4CL	
1−b−A	−b	/4CL	
]

from which the optimal retail price and proﬁts for the
three parties are calculated. These results are tabu-
lated in Table 2 in Appendix A.
Substituting the value of w∗3P back in 
3PM , the man-
ufacturer’s proﬁts are given by
−cm	2/8	
1−− b	b−A	/4CL	

We make the following observation regarding the
optimal b value in the 3P Model.
Observation 2. The manufacturer’s proﬁt function
is maximized when b= +A	/2.
Note that in the 3P Model, the incentive of the
third party to invest in the used-product collection
effort is directly driven by b, the transfer price. Hence,
the manufacturer faces the following tradeoff. If she
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assigns a large value to b, she observes a high level
of investment by the third party in used-product col-
lection, but at the same time, her net savings from
remanufacturing diminish, (i.e., − b decreases) and,
therefore, her proﬁts decrease as b approaches . We
ﬁnd that the direct and indirect effects of b on the
manufacturer’s proﬁts balance when b = +A	/2,
i.e., when both parties equally share the gains from
remanufacturing.
From Observations 1 and 2, it is important to
note that the transfer price b has completely differ-
ent implications for the supply chain proﬁts in the R
and the 3P Models. In the R Model, through b, the
unit cost savings from remanufacturing are directly
reﬂected in the ﬁnal demand of the product (i.e., the
retailer sets a lower price for the product), whereas
in the 3P Model, b is a direct cost (i.e., a reduc-
tion in unit cost savings) for the manufacturer and
the supply chain. Hence, the choice of the manu-
facturer concerning with whom and how she shares
the cost savings from product remanufacturing has
important consequences for forward channel pricing
decisions.
In the following section, we compare the three sup-
ply chain models with respect to the retail price, the
product return rate, and the proﬁts of the channel
members.
5. Comparison of the Three
Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models
Based on the results summarized in Tables 1 and 2,
some interesting observations can be made on the per-
formance of decentralized closed-loop supply chain
structures.
Proposition 1. The optimal product return rates are
related as ∗C > ∗R > ∗M > ∗3P .
Note that while the total savings from reman-
ufacturing in the third-party model are given by
b−A	Dpw		, the total savings are given by
−A	Dpw		 in the manufacturer collecting
model. From Observation 2, we see that the marginal
beneﬁt of investing in increasing  in the 3P Model
is less than the marginal gains in the M Model (i.e.,
b∗3P − A	 < − A	). Hence, the third party invests
less in used-product collection compared to the man-
ufacturer in the manufacturer collecting system. In
addition, the manufacturer can strategically set w in
a way that would make used-product collection more
proﬁtable resulting in a second-degree effect on  .
Comparing the closed-loop supply chain models
where the manufacturer versus the retailer collects,
from Observation 1, we see that while both the manu-
facturer and the retailer face the same marginal gains
from investing in increasing  (i.e., b∗R −A= −A),
the retailer can impact the market size by choosing p,
whereas the manufacturer can inﬂuence the demand
only by strategically choosing the wholesale price, w.
The M Model has a lower product return rate than the
R Model, because of double marginalization, the unit
cost savings from remanufacturing is only partially
reﬂected in the ﬁnal price of the product.
The centrally coordinated system leads to the
highest investment level in used-product collection,
because the decisions are fully coordinated in the
channel.
The implications of Proposition 1 form the basis
of an interesting ﬁnding of the paper, vis-à-vis, the
closer an agent is to the market, the more efﬁcient is
the collection of used products for all parties involved
in the channel. The effective loss of efﬁciency in the
decentralized system is mitigated, in part, by the abil-
ity to act more closely at inﬂuencing the underlying
demand.
Proposition 2. The retail prices in the coordinated
channel and the three cases in the decentralized channel are
related as follows: p∗C < p∗R < p∗M < p∗3P . Consequently,
D∗C >D∗R >D∗M >D∗3P .
The investment in collecting used products from
the market beneﬁts only the third party directly in
the 3P system, and there is only a second-order effect
on the retail price in the form of a lower whole-
sale price offered by the manufacturer to the retailer.
The effect on the retail price is more direct in the
M Model, as the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale
price to increase demand, and thereby increases her
savings through product remanufacturing. The reduc-
tion in retail price in the R Model is the largest among
the decentralized channels, as the retailer can directly
reﬂect the unit cost savings in the ﬁnal demand
through his pricing decision. The price in the coor-
dinated channel is lower than all three decentralized
channels, because the gains in efﬁciency from the
coordination effort can be effectively shared with the
market to increase both demand and proﬁts.
Proposition 3. The manufacturer’s and retailer’s prof-
its in the decentralized channel are related as follows:

∗RM >

∗M
M >

∗3P
M and 

∗R
R >

∗M
R >

∗3P
R . The total prof-
its in the coordinated channel with recovery always dom-
inate the total proﬁts in the decentralized channel with
recovery. Speciﬁcally, 
∗C >
∗RT >

∗M
T >

∗3P
T .
The implication of Proposition 3 and this section is
that the ranking of the different closed-loop supply
chain structures (in terms of beneﬁts to the manu-
facturer and retailer) mirrors the beneﬁts to nonsup-
ply chain members as well. The beneﬁts to society,
in terms of an increased used-product return rate
(greater reuse of products) as well as an increased
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ability to buy the product (greater demand), com-
plement the increased proﬁts for the manufacturer
and retailer in the coordinated system and R Model.
McCartney (1999) and our own observations in the
industry empirically corroborate the ﬁndings of the
model. When the manufacturer owns the distribution
channel, as in the coordinated case, the manufacturer
undertakes the used-product collection effort herself,
as in the case of Xerox (Xerox Corporation 2001).
In the next section, we show that the manufac-
turer can further improve the proﬁts in the R Model
by coordinating the forward and the reverse chan-
nel decisions via a single two-part tariff. To highlight
incentive issues, we consider an environment where
all cost parameters are common knowledge to the
channel members (i.e., no adverse selection problem)
and the used-product collection effort is fully observ-
able (i.e., no moral hazard problem).
6. Improvements on the R Model
Under the assumption of complete information about
cost and demand data and full observability of the
retailer’s cost when he undertakes the used-product
collection effort, we show that the manufacturer can
offer a wholesale price to the retailer to induce him
to choose an effort level that maximizes total chan-
nel proﬁts. The details of the proof are presented in
Appendix C. Proposition 4 states one form of the opti-
mal contract that the manufacturer offers the retailer.
The optimal coordinating wholesale price is linear
in the unit cost of manufacturing, cm and  . w	
stands for a wholesale pricing scheme contingent on
the return rate of used products from the market, and
F is a ﬁxed payment made by the retailer to the manu-
facturer that distributes the efﬁciency gains. 
∗C is the
total proﬁts in the coordinated channel, and 
RR is
the retailer’s proﬁts in the decentralized channel with
the retailer collecting.
Proposition 4. The form of the optimal contract,
W ∗	 = w∗	 F ∗	, which ensures that the retailer
undertakes the coordinated collection effort level and
charges the optimal coordinated retail price is given by
w∗	= cm− − b	 , 0<  < 1, and F ∗ =
∗C −
RR.
As stated in the above proposition, to ensure that
the retailer’s proﬁt-maximizing product return rate
is, indeed, equal to the coordinated channel prod-
uct return rate, the manufacturer offers a wholesale
pricing scheme contingent on the product return rate
characterized by the term  − b	 . Speciﬁcally, the
manufacturer puts the retailer in a position where
he directly internalizes the cost consequence of his
used-product collection effort. Besides ensuring the
coordinated channel product return rate, the contract
also provides a means for making the retail price of
the product equal to the coordinated channel price
level, thereby overcoming inefﬁciencies because of
double marginalization. The optimal contract makes
the transfer price b unnecessary, as the manufacturer’s
proﬁts are the same for any b ≤.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the extant litera-
ture in marketing and economics, which shows that
if the manufacturer transfers the products at the real-
ized unit cost of production, coordinated channel
retail price and proﬁt levels can be attained in the
decentralized setting. The ﬁxed payment, F can be
seen as a franchisee fee paid by the retailer to the
manufacturer to have the rights not only to sell the prod-
uct in the market, but also to collect the used units. It is
interesting to note that by using a single contractual
agreement (i.e., a simple two-part tariff, linear in ),
the manufacturer can coordinate the decisions in the
closed-loop supply chain. Simple forms of contractual
agreements for channel coordination also make the
R Model more attractive for the manufacturer com-
pared to a third-party system, for which one would
need to design separate contractual agreements for
the retailer and for the third party (Savaskan et al.
1999).
7. Contributions, Limitations, and
Future Research
Designing effective remanufacturing systems has
important ramiﬁcations for ﬁrms, regulatory bodies,
and the market. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper
has been to identify the appropriate closed-loop sup-
ply chain structure for OEMs. We show that ﬁrms
can design closed-loop supply chains to enhance their
proﬁts and market demand, and in conjunction, can
increase the used-product return rate. Coordination
mechanisms are suggested to better achieve the above
aims by providing suitable incentives in the form of
simple two-part tariffs (a per unit wholesale price lin-
ear in product return rate coupled with a franchisee
fee) to align the objectives of the members in the
closed-loop supply chain.
In the early phase of this research, we have made a
number of assumptions that must be relaxed in future
research to develop a more comprehensive under-
standing of remanufacturing systems. We assume
that, for the agent who implements the used-product
collection effort, an infrastructure for the logistics of
getting products back from customers and deliver-
ing them to the OEM already exists independently.
Based on the model analysis and insights, we conjec-
ture that a high cost of establishing such a network
would make it even more appropriate for a for-
ward distribution channel member (e.g., the retailer)
to undertake the used-product collection effort, as
such networks are already in place in typical systems
for forward distribution activities. This paper consid-
ered only a single agent undertaking the collection
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process. If there are multiple agents (e.g., retailers)
undertaking the collection process in separate mar-
kets (such as geographically dispersed markets), the
results of the model are not affected. Savaskan and
Van Wassenhove (2001) study the impact of product
collection on retail competition. The location of the
agents vis-à-vis the consumers and proximity to
the market was not considered in this research. If the
used-product collection is done through a ﬁxed-price
delivery system (such as prepaid envelopes in the
regular mail), then the results of the model are not
affected. We also did not model the multiperiod game,
an extension of this study could ﬁnd the impact of
possible nonstationary material ﬂows on the channel
choice decision.
We also assume that the ﬁrm has designed the
product platform for reuse so that older products
can be easily incorporated partially or wholly into
the new product (Xerox Corporation 2001). An exten-
sion of this study should consider product platform
design issues to make products easier to remanufac-
ture. This research also assumed that all the prod-
ucts that are collected are usable for remanufacturing
into new products. Future research should investigate
the effect of the degree of product durability in the
remanufacturing process.
We assume that the marginal cost of collecting a
used unit is independent of the scale of the opera-
tions. This is consistent with supply chain structures
where there is already an existing reverse logistics
network in place with sufﬁcient capacity. There are
two interesting avenues of research concerning costs
of the collection effort. First, one can examine the
choice of closed-loop supply chain when the marginal
cost of collection increases with the scale of oper-
ations.12 Second, one can also investigate capacity
investment decisions in the closed-loop supply chain.
Third, we assumed that the cost of collecting a used
unit is the same for all the agents of collection. An
extension of this research could consider the case of
unequal costs of collection because of economies of
scale (we conjecture that this would favor third-party
collection), proximity to the consumer (this would
favor retailer collection), and other possible reasons.
The modeling framework in this paper can easily be
extended to address such related questions.
In summary, this paper makes a contribution to the
literature on distribution channel design by drawing
attention to closed-loop supply chains, and develop-
ing a model of the tradeoffs underlying such systems.
Our recommendation is that ﬁrms make a conscious
12 One way to model this aspect is to assume a total cost func-
tion, which is convex (e.g., quadratic) in the number of returned
products.
choice of supply chain, as different closed-loop sup-
ply chains may be appropriate in different environ-
ments, depending on the cost structures of the agents
of collection. Section 5, which summarizes the results
of the model, provides some guidance in this regard.
A combined design of the closed-loop supply chain
can not only provide the ﬁrm with much-needed ﬂex-
ibility to reduce logistics costs for forward and reverse
activities, but also enable it to signal continued con-
cern and action on environmental issues.
Appendix A
Lemma 1. If the condition of 
C	/=1 < 0 is satisﬁed,
then ∗C , ∗R, ∗M , and ∗C are all between 0 and 1.
Proof. Consider Model C—Centrally Coordinated Model.
For 
C to be concave in p and  
C should sat-
isfy conditions (i) 2
C/2 < 0, (ii) 2
C/p2 < 0, and
(iii) 2
C/p2	2
C/2	 > 2
C/p	2. Note that (i)
holds since 2
C/2 = −2CL and CL > 0. Likewise, (ii)
holds since 2
C/p2 = −2 < 0 and > 0. To have an
interior point solution for ∗C (i.e., ∗C < 1), we impose

C/=1 < 0. This condition can be written as 4CL >
 − cm	 ·  − A	 +  − A	2. For condition (iii)
to hold, we need −2CL	−2	 > 2 − A	2 ⇒ 4CL >
−A	2, which follows from the previous condition. Note
that from condition (iii) and  > A, ∗C > 0 follows auto-
matically (see Table 1).
Consider Model M—Manufacturer Collecting Model.

MR is concave in p since 
2
MR /p
2 =−2< 0 and > 0.

MM is concave in w and  since 
2
MM/w
2 = − < 0,
2
MM/
2 =−2CL < 0 and 2
MM/w2	2
MM/2	= 2CL >
2/4	−A	2 = 2
MM/w	2. Note that the last inequality
holds from the condition 
C	/=1 < 0	 of Model C,
and it ensures ∗M > 0 (see Table 2).
From Tables 1 and 2, we have ∗M = − cm	−A	 ·
8CL−−A	2	−1 < ∗C , hence, ∗M < 1.
Table 1 Comparison of Coordinated Supply Chain Models with or
Without Remanufacturing
Channel Decentralized Coordinated
decision supply supply Coordinated supply
and chain without chain without chain with
proﬁts remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing
∗T
3− cm2
16
− cm2
4
− cm2/4

1− −A2/4CL2
p∗
3+ cm
4
+ cm
2
+ cm
2
− − cm−A
2
24CL− −A2
 ∗ N/A N/A
− cm−A
4CL− −A2
w ∗
+ cm
2
N/A N/A
∗M
− cm2
8
N/A N/A
∗R
− cm2
16
N/A N/A
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Table 2 Comparison of Decentralized Supply Chain Models with Remanufacturing
Channel decision
and proﬁts R Model M Model 3P Model
∗T
3/4− cm2/4

1− −A2/4CL
− cm2/4
[
3/4− −A2/16CL
]
[
1− −A2/8CL
]2 − cm
2/4
[
3/4− −A2/64CL
]
[
1− −A2/16CL
]2
p∗

3CL− −A2+ CLcm

4CL− −A2
3+ cm
4
− − cm−A
2
4
8CL− −A2
3+ cm
4
− − cm−A
2
4
16CL− −A2
 ∗
− cm−A
8CL− 2−A2
− cm−A
8CL− −A2
− cm−A

16CL− −A2
w ∗
+ cm
2
+ cm
2
− −A
2
− cm
2
8CL− −A2
+ cm
2
− − cm−A
2
2
16CL− −A2
∗M
− cm2/8[
1− −A2/4CL
] − cm2/8[
1− −A2/8CL
] − cm2/8[
1− −A2/16CL
]
∗R
− cm2
16
[
1− −A2/4CL
] − cm2
16
[
1− −A2/8CL2
− cm2/16[
1− −A2/16CL
]2
∗3P N/A N/A
− cm2/16−A2/16CL[
1− −A2/16CL
]2
Consider Model R—Retailer Collecting Model.

RR is strictly concave in p and  since 
2
RR/p
2 = −2
< 0, 2
RR/
2 = −2CL < 0 and 2
RR/p2	2
RR/2	 =
4CL > 2b−A	2 = 2
RR/w	2. Note that when the con-
dition 
C	/=1 < 0	 of Model C and b ≤  hold,
the last inequality is satisﬁed. From Table 2, we see that
∗R = −cm	−A	/24CL−−A	 · −A		= ∗C/2.
Because 0< ∗C < 1, we get 0< ∗R < 1.
For Model 3P, Third-Party Collecting Model, the concavity
and the interior point conditions can be easily shown in a
similar manner. 
Appendix B
Proof of Observation 1. For the R system, the proof
of Observation 1 can be given as follows. First, we show
that the manufacturer’s proﬁt function is concave in w for
a given b. This allows us to optimize the manufacturer’s
problem ﬁrst over w for a given b and then examine the
effect of b. Note that in the R system, for a given w and b,
the retailer solves the following problem:
Max
p 
p−w	−p	+ b−p	−CL2−A−p	
The optimal p and  values are listed in the text in §4.3.
The manufacturer takes into account the reaction function of
the retailer and solves the following optimization problem.
Max
wb
w− cm+ − b	∗wb	Dp∗wb		
After substituting t∗wb	 and p∗wb	 the problem of the
manufacturer is given by:
Max
wb
2CL
4CL−b−A	2
−w	w− cm	
+ 2CLb−A	− b	
4CL−b−A	2	2
−w	2
To show that the manufacturer’s proﬁts are concave in w
for a given b, we examine the sign of 2
RM/w
2. It follows
that
2
RM
w2
= 2CL
4CL−b−A	2
−2	+ 4CL
2b−A	− b	
4CL−b−A	2	2

To show 2
RM/w
2 < 0 for a given b, one needs to show
that
4CL2b−A	− b	
4CL−b−A	2	2
<
4CL
4CL−b−A	2
or, equivalently, b − A	 − b	 < 4CL − b − A	2, which
reduces to b−A	−A	 < 4CL. Because 4CL > −A	2
holds from the interior point restriction on ∗ in Model C
(Lemma 1) and b ≤, it follows that b−A	−A	< 4CL
holds. Hence, 
RM is concave in w for a given b.
In the second part of the proof, we examine the effect of
b on the proﬁts of the manufacturer. Hence, the proof of
Observation 1 for the R system follows from the fact that

RR/b and 

R
M/b ≥ 0. To show these statements, note
that

RM
b
= −cm	
2
32CL
−A
1−−A	b−A	/4CL		2

which is always positive. From the value of 
RR, after some
simpliﬁcation,

RR
b
= −cm	
2
32CL
− b
1−−A	b−A	/4CL		3

which is always nonnegative from the assumption that
≥ b and b − A	 − A	/4CL	 ≤  − A	2/4CL	 < 1,
which follows from our Assumption 9. 
Proof of Observation. We follow a similar procedure
for the proof of the optimal b value in the 3P system. First,
we show that the manufacturer’s proﬁts are concave in w
for a given b and then, we optimize over b. In the 3P system,
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.4
3.7
7]
 on
 02
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
17
, a
t 0
5:1
5 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Savaskan, Bhattacharya, and Van Wassenhove: Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models
250 Management Science 50(2), pp. 239–252, © 2004 INFORMS
the retailer and the third party solve the following prob-
lems, respectively, for p∗w	 and ∗b	: Maxpp−w	−p	
and Maxb−p	−CL2−A−p	.
The manufacturer takes into account the reaction func-
tions of the retailer and the third party and solves the fol-
lowing optimization problem for w∗:
Max
w
−p∗w	w− cm+ − b	∗b	
Max
w
−w
2
[
w− cm+
− b	b−A	−w	
4CL
]

To show that the manufacturer’s proﬁt is concave in w
for a given b, we examine the sign of 2
3PM /w
2. Note
that 2
3PM /w
2 = −1 − b − A	 − b	/4CL	. By rear-
ranging the terms, it follows that the concavity condition
2
3PM /w
2 < 0 reduces to 4CL > b −A	− b	. From the
interior point restriction on ∗ in Model C (Lemma 1),
this holds true. Because b − A	 − b	 is equivalent to
b −A	−A	− b −A	2, which is less than −A	2,
the concavity condition 4CL > b−A	− b	 also holds for
a given b.
Next, we solve for the optimal b value, which maximizes
the manufacturer’s proﬁts. Note that the optimization of

3PM =
−cm	2/8	
1−− b	b−A	/4CL	
w.r.t. b is equivalent to the minimization of the expression
1−− b	b−A	/4CL	, and this expression is minimized
when − b	b−A	 is maximized. It can easily be shown
that b∗ = +A	/2.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of Proposition 1 can
be trivially observed from the values of ∗ (the product
return rate) for the CRM , and 3P channels in Table 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. We divide the proof into three
parts:
(i) To prove p∗C < p∗R, we have to show that
+cm
2
− −cm	−A	
2
24CL−−A	2	
<
3CL−−A	2+CLcm
4CL−−A	2

After simpliﬁcation, this reduces to showing that
+cm
2
<
+cm	4CL−−A	2+ 2CL−cm	
24CL−−A	2
or  > cm, which is true by Assumption 4 (nonnegative
demand).
(ii) To prove p∗R < p∗M , we have to show that
3CL−−A	2+CLcm
4CL−−A	2
<
3+cm
4
− −cm	−A	
2
48CL−−A	2
or
−cm	−A	2
48CL−−A	2
<
{
3+cm	4CL−−A	2
− 3CL−−A	24− 4CLcm
}
· {44CL−−A	2}−1
On simpliﬁcation, this reduces to showing that
−cm	−A	2
48CL−−A	2
<
−cm	−A	2
44CL−−A	2

which follows from simple algebra.
(iii) To show that p∗M < p∗3P , we have to show
3+cm
4
− −cm	−A	
2
48CL−−A	2
<
3+cm
4
− −cm	−A	
2
416CL−−A	2

which follows from simple algebra. Because the ordering
for the retail price p∗ holds, the ordering for the demands
of the channels follows trivially. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 3 fol-
lows from simple algebra. In Table 2, 
∗RM >

∗M
M and 

∗M
M >

∗3PM are obvious, as are the results of 

∗R
R >

∗M
R and 

∗M
R >

∗3PR . Because 

∗R
M >

∗M
M and 

∗R
R >

∗M
R , it trivially follows
that 
∗RT >

∗M
T . To show that 

∗M
T >

∗3P
T , we have to show
−cm	2
4
[
3
4
− −A	
2
16CL
]
[
1− −A	
2
8CL
]2 >
−cm	2
4
[
3
4
− −A	
2
64CL
]
[
1− −A	
2
16CL
]2 
which follows from simple algebra. The proof of 
∗C >
∗RT
is analogous.
Appendix C
Following the theory of incentive contracts (see Laffont and
Tirole 1993), we take a principal-agent approach, with the
manufacturer as the principal. The role of the manufacturer
as the principal is consistent with the spirit of the earlier
sections of this paper, which give the manufacturer the role
of the leader in the Stackelberg game. The manufacturer can
inﬂuence the retailer’s choice of the collection effort level
by specifying a contract of the type W	= w	 F . Here,
w	 stands for a wholesale pricing scheme contingent on
the return rate of used products from the market, and F is a
ﬁxed payment made by the retailer to the manufacturer that
distributes the efﬁciency gains. Thus, the manufacturer’s
problem is formulated as
Max
W	 

RM = w	− cm−		Dp	− bDp	+ F (5)
subject to
 = argmax

$
RRW	 b	% (6)
p= argmax
p
$
RRW	 b	% (7)

RRW	 b	≥
RR (8)
where 
RR is the retailer’s proﬁt level realized in the
decentralized channel structure, and 
RRW	 b	 = p −
w	Dp	+ bDp	− C	− F is the proﬁt function of the
retailer under the contract W	. The ﬁrst two constraints
are the incentive compatibility constraints for  and p,
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respectively, which ensure that p and  are maximizers of
the retailer’s proﬁt function, while the last constraint is the
individual rationality constraint of the manufacturer, which
ensures that the retailer accepts the contract.
When the retailer retains private information about the
cost of his collection effort (i.e., the adverse selection prob-
lem), or when the collection effort level of the retailer cannot
be fully observed, or there is noise in the return rate of used
products (i.e., the moral hazard problem), the optimal con-
tract is updated to incorporate the information constraints.
In Savaskan et al. (1999), it is shown that the adverse selec-
tion problem in the closed-loop supply chain can be over-
come by using a menu of contracts, which would induce the
retailer to reveal the true cost of his collection effort to the
manufacturer. However, to achieve this, the manufacturer
leaves some rent with the retailer, which leads to an inef-
ﬁcient level of product return rate and lower supply chain
proﬁts. If the manufacturer faces moral hazard issues in the
closed-loop supply chain, and if the retailer is risk neutral,
one can easily show that the full information outcome can
be obtained by using the linear contract outlined as above
(Holmstrom 1979, 1982). When the retailer is risk averse,
the optimal contract is adjusted by taking into consideration
the risk aversion of the retailer and the information on the
product return rate.
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